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Under attack?
Banking & Islamic finance

Attackers do not want to breach your bank. They want to move money out of it.

Financial institutions face the most commercially motivated adversaries there are: organised groups with a monetisation plan, buying access rather than earning it, and a regulator watching how quickly you notice.

What they are after
Core banking and payment systems
Card data and the PCI environment
The ATM and self-service estate
Customer records and identity data
Access itself, resold to other groups
The chain

Five steps to your money, and the control that breaks each one

An attack on a bank is a sequence, not an event. Break any link and the rest of the chain is worth nothing, which is why the cheapest defence is rarely the last one.

01

Reconnaissance

Staff, suppliers and exposed services mapped. Credentials from earlier breaches bought on criminal forums, where trade in access to financial organisations has grown roughly fivefold.

What breaks it

Threat intelligence and dark web monitoring name the actor and surface your own leaked credentials before they are used.

02

Perimeter breach

Phishing against named employees, exploitation of an unpatched internet-facing service, or simply logging in with a credential that was never rotated.

What breaks it

Email security ahead of the mailbox, measured awareness training, and a vulnerability cycle that closes exposure before it is found for you.

03

Foothold and persistence

Remote access trojans and commodity malware deployed to hold position, frequently the tooling of choice in attacks on financial organisations.

What breaks it

Endpoint detection with retained telemetry and automated containment, so a single host is isolated instead of becoming a beachhead.

04

Lateral movement

Movement towards core banking, the card environment or the ATM segment, using legitimate credentials wherever possible.

What breaks it

Network detection across internal traffic, privileged access brokered through one recorded gateway, and segmentation that means a stolen account reaches one system.

05

Monetisation

Fraudulent transfers, card data theft, cash dispensing, or extortion against disclosure of customer records.

What breaks it

Database security and data leakage prevention around the records themselves, plus device-level assurance on ATMs and payment terminals.

The regulator

Two audiences, one body of evidence

Your board wants the risk contained. Your regulator wants it evidenced. Built properly, the same control set answers both without a separate reporting exercise.

Central Bank requirementsPCI DSSPCI-S3ISO 27001Personal data protectionInternal audit

Central Bank regulatory compliance

Requirements interpreted for your size and licence, with the control mapping and evidence trail maintained continuously.

PCI DSS and PCI-S3

Scope reduced first, then the card environment assessed, remediated and kept in a state that survives the next audit.

ISO 27001:2022

A management system that runs the bank rather than a folder assembled before certification week.

Risk assessment and treatment

A register with owners, ratings and dates, which is the document every one of the above ultimately asks for.

What changes

The metrics a banking board should be asking about

Not tool counts. These four, tracked monthly, are what tell you whether the spend is working.

MTTD
Mean time to detect

From first attacker action to your team knowing about it. The number most institutions cannot state.

MTTR
Mean time to respond

From detection to containment. Retainers and playbooks move this from days to hours.

Exposure
Open critical findings

How many critical vulnerabilities are open, and for how long, against an agreed SLA.

Coverage
Monitored estate

What proportion of hosts, segments and applications are actually in scope of monitoring.

Related

Where most banks start

Managed SOC

Round-the-clock monitoring and triage, either fully managed or co-managed with your team.

Penetration testing

Annual testing that the regulator expects, run against the systems that actually matter.

Incident response retainer

Agreed response times and a team that already knows your environment before the call.

Start with the chain, not the catalogue.

We assess where your institution sits against each of the five steps and tell you which link is cheapest to break first.