A vulnerability is a mistake. A design that cannot defend itself is a decision.

Threat modelling is the only assurance activity that can remove a vulnerability class before it is written. Everything else finds them after somebody has paid to build them.

Define the business objective

What the application exists to do, what it is worth, and what an attacker would gain by subverting it. Threat modelling that starts from technology produces a list; starting from business impact produces a priority order.

Define the technical scope

Architecture, components, dependencies, third-party services and trust boundaries enumerated. You cannot reason about an attack surface you have not drawn.

Decompose the application

Data flows traced end to end: entry points, assets, actors, privilege levels and where data crosses a boundary. This is where implicit trust between components becomes visible.

Analyse the threats

Threat scenarios built from adversaries who plausibly target you, mapped against the decomposition rather than against a generic catalogue.

Analyse weaknesses

Known and likely weaknesses correlated to the threat scenarios, so each one is tied to something an attacker would actually do with it.

Model the attacks

Attack paths constructed and, where scope allows, simulated, establishing which threats are genuinely exploitable in this design rather than theoretically possible.

Analyse risk and impact

Residual risk assessed by likelihood and business consequence, with countermeasures proposed and sequenced by risk reduction per unit of effort.

Six artefacts your engineers can build against

A threat model that lives in a report is a document. One that lives in the team’s design process is a control.

At design

Before code exists. The cheapest possible time to remove a class of vulnerability, and the only time architectural fixes are still inexpensive.

Before a major release

A significant feature, an integration or a re-platform changes the attack surface. The model is updated rather than rebuilt.

On acquired or inherited systems

Software you did not build and whose design assumptions nobody in the building can explain.

After a testing programme plateaus

When penetration tests keep finding variations of the same issue, the cause is usually a design decision, not the individual bugs.

One application

A defined engagement against a single application or platform: decomposition, threat scenarios, attack paths, risk-rated findings and a countermeasure plan, delivered with a working session for your engineers.

Application assessment →

Embedded in the lifecycle

Threat modelling built into how you design: your architects trained to run it, a maintained model per product, and our review at the design gates that matter.

Secure code review →

Secure code review

The model says where to look hardest. Review is where design intent meets implementation.

Penetration testing

Testing validates whether the countermeasures the model called for actually work.

Threat intelligence

Adversary selection should be evidence-based. Intelligence is what makes the scenarios plausible.

Model the one that would hurt most.

Pick the application whose compromise would cost you the most. We decompose it and show you the paths that are currently open.